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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner Thompson Creek Mining Company ("Thompson Creek") challenges the 
decision of the Director of the Respondent Idaho Department of Water Resources (the "Director" 
or the "Department") to create Water District No. 170 ("WDl 70"). WDl 70 includes the upper 
portions of the Salmon River Basin in the Department's administrative basins 71 and 72. 1 The 
Director violated the Due Process clauses of the Idaho and United States Constitutions and 
applicable requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (the "Idaho APA"). Idaho 
law specifically requires that a water district may be formed only when one is "required in order 
to properly administer uses of the water resource." However, the administrative record contains 
virtually no evidence to support the Director's decision to create WDl 70. 
The primary citation in the administrative record to justify creation of WD 170 is a 
settlement agreement concerning federal instream water rights. By improperly fixating on that 
agreement, the Director violated the Due Process rights of Thompson Creek and other affected 
water users in two ways. First, the agreement biased the Director in favor of creating WD 170 
prior to a hearing, because he wrongly believed he was required to create the water district. 
Second, the Director's improper fixation upon the requirements of the agreement deprived the 
general public and the affected water users of the opportunity to provide meaningful input 
' A map depicting the geographic scope ofWD170 is available on Vol. 3, p. 580 of the 
Record, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 1. 
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regarding the necessity for the water district, because Department personnel repeatedly informed 
interested parties that the agreement required the Department to create WD 170. 
The decision to create WD 170 should be reversed. However, if the Court affirms 
creation ofWDl 70, it should exclude Thompson Creek from it. Thompson Creek executed a 
separate, judicially approved settlement and cannot be bound by the subsequent agreement, 
especially its provision requiring creation ofWDl 70. 
B. Course And Disposition Of Proceedings Below 
Thompson Creek argued its appeal of the Department's creation ofWDl 70 before the 
district court on November 21, 2007. The district court issued its Memorandum Decision 
denying Thompson Creek's request for relief and upholding the Department's creation of 
WDl 70 on February 22, 2008. 
C. Statement Of Facts 
1. Water Districts Generally 
This action challenges the Director's creation ofWDl 70 in Basins 71 and 72 of the 
Upper Salmon River Basin. The general purpose of a water district, if one is required, is to 
regulate distribution of water pursuant to Idaho's prior appropriation doctrine after water rights 
have been adjudicated. See l.C. § 42-602. Because of substantial costs and imposition of 
significant governmental restrictions upon private property rights protected by our constitutions, 
Thompson Creek believes the creation of a water district should be subject to careful scrutiny. 
If formed, a water district must hire a watermaster and assistants to oversee distribution 
of water within the district. LC. §§ 42-605(3), 42-610. The district pays the watermaster, 
2 Client:966775.5 
acquires property, collects data, measures water, controls water delivery, and keeps records. 
LC. § 42-605A(3). In this particular case, water district formation also involves the purchase, 
installation, maintenauce, aud repair oflockable headgates and measuring devices by water 
users. (R., Vol. 3, p. 579.) 
The district water users must pay these costs. LC. §§ 42-605A(3), 42-610. In fact, a 
water user's share of the district's expenses becomes a personal debt, aud the water district may 
file an action to collect such amounts. LC.§§ 42-612(4), 42-613, 42-616. Also, failure to pay 
the assessments cau mean shut off of water deliveries. LC. §§ 42-617, 42-618. 
WDl 70 encompasses the Upper Salmon River Basin, described by the Department as 
administrative basins 71 and 72. Except for a few water users in three small, pre-existing water 
districts in Basin 72, the vast majority of water users in these two basins have never been 
subjected to the governmental costs or restrictions of a water district. 
Recognizing the burdens on water users, the Idaho Legislature granted the Director 
authority to create a water district only when it is "required in order to properly administer uses 
of the water resources." LC. § 42-604, ,r 2 ( emphasis added). So, creation of a water district cau 
only be justified from a water resource management perspective and this maudatory element is 
essential. The Record in this case reflects nothing to demonstrate satisfaction of this statutory 
requirement. 
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2. The Snake River Basin Adjudication And The Wild And Scenic Rivers 
Agreement 
This dispute arises in the context of the Snake River Basin Adjudication (the "SRBA"), 
which the State ofldaho began in 1987 to adjudicate the water rights within Idaho's Snake River 
basin. See 1985 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 18, § 1, as amended by 1985 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.118, 
§ 1, and 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 454, § 11. Generally speaking, the SRBA process consists 
of these sequential steps within each administrative basin: 
(1) the filing of claims by those who claim to own water rights within the particular 
basin; 
(2) the investigation of those claims by the Department; 
(3) the issuance by the Department of a "Director's Report" providing 
recommendations to the SRBA District Court in Twin Falls (the "SRBA Court") 
regarding how the water rights claimed should be decreed; 
(4) an objection period; 
(5) a judicial process for resolving any objections to the Director's Report; and 
( 6) the issuance of partial decrees for water rights within the basin. 
See generally l.C. §§ 42-1409-42-1413. 
During the SRBA, the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service"), submitted claims 
to instream water rights in central Idaho, including the main stem of the Salmon River, claiming 
all of the Salmon River's unappropriated flows. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 853-54, 856-57, 859-60); 
Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 134 Idaho 912,913, 12 P.3d 1256, 1257 (Idaho 2000).2 The 
2 The Idaho Supreme Court's Potlatch opinion arose out of the same SRBA subcase that 
generated the "Wild & Scenic Rivers Agreement." As Sections V.B and V.C of this Brief 
explain, and as the Record in this case explicitly demonstrates, that Agreement was the 
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basis for these claims was the federal Wild & Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1271-1287. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 853, 856.) Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 912, 12 P.3d at 1256. The 
Forest Service claimed the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act grants the federal government instream 
water rights for "wild and scenic" rivers to preserve their scenic, recreational, fish and wildlife 
values. (R., Vol. 5, p. 860.) Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 914-16, 12 P.3d at 1258-60; see also 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1271, 1284(c). 
Importantly, Basin 72-the administrative basin in which Thompson Creek owns 
multiple water rights--encompasses part of the upper portion of the main stem of the Salmon 
River and is upstream of the areas of the Forest Service instream water rights claims. Because of 
its location, Thompson Creek legitimately feared that if the Forest Service obtained instream 
water rights, it would force shut off of water diversions by Thompson Creek and other Basin 72 
water users during water shortage. Accordingly, Thompson Creek objected to the Forest Service 
claims. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 869-74, 876-82); Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 913, 12 P.3d at 1257. Other 
water users and the State of Idaho also objected, and the dispute became consolidated subcase 
number 75-13316 before the SRBA Court. Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 912-13, 12 P.3d at 1256-57. 
On May 29, 1998, Thompson Creek and the Forest Service entered into a settlement 
subordinating any claimed instream water rights to Thompson Creek's water rights. (R., Vol. 4, 
pp. 689-706.) The SRBA Court approved this stipulation on June 16, 1998. (R., Vol. 4, 
Director's entire basis for creating WDI 70. Accordingly, Potlatch provides a helpful 
explanation of the legal background of the federal government's SRBA claims to instream flow 
water rights under the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act and, ultimately, of the creation ofWDI 70. 
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pp. 708-11.) Because the settlement only involved the Forest Service and Thompson Creek, 
several objectors to the Wild & Scenic River Act claims remained, and the litigation continued.' 
Finally, on August 20, 2004, the Forest Service and the remaining objectors, including 
the State of Idaho, entered into and filed a Stipulation and Joint Motion for Order Approving 
Stipulation and Entry of Partial Decrees, purporting to resolve the dispute over the federal 
claims. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 712-39.) This stipulation is known as the "Wild & Scenic Rivers 
Agreement" (the "W &SR Agreement" or "Agreement"). 
Because Thompson Creek already had settled its dispute over the claims, it was not a 
party to the W &SR Agreement. In fact, on October 14, 2004, Thompson Creek filed a timely 
objection (and memorandum in support thereof) to the W&SR Agreement. (R., Vol. 5, 
pp. 884-87.) Thompson Creek objected to the Agreement on several bases, including that the 
Agreement "calls for the management and distribution of water by means contrary to Idaho law." 
Id. 
Thompson Creek primarily objected to Paragraph 2 of the Agreement. In that detailed 
provision, the State ofldaho agreed to perform extensive water right administration and 
enforcement duties. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 712, 714-18.) In particular, Paragraph 2 of the Agreement 
provides that: 
3 Significantly, the SRBA District Court approved this settlement despite the objection of 
the State ofldaho. See State ofldaho's Response Memorandum to the United States/Thompson 
Creek Motion to Approve Stipulation, In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase Nos. 63-25239, 
75-13316 and 75-13605 (5th Dist. June 12, 1998), attached hereto as Addendum 2. This Court 
may take judicial notice of this SRBA filing pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, and 
Thompson Creek hereby requests the Court to do so. 
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IDWR will establish a water district for the Upper Salmon River Basin. 
The Upper Salmon Water District (the "USWD") shall initially consist of 
administrative basins 71 and 72, those basins for which Director's Reports 
have been filed for irrigation and other water rights. Within six months of 
the filing of Director's Reports for administrative basins 73, 74 and 75, the 
parties will file a joint petition with the SRBA Court, pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 42-1417, for an order for interim administration of those basins 
and IDWR will incorporate those basins into the USWD. Existing water 
districts within the basins will be converted to subdistricts within the 
USWD as appropriate to facilitate management. 
(R., Vol. 4, p. 715) (emphasis added). 
The SRBA Court approved the W&SR Agreement on November 17, 2004 (the "W&SR 
Order"). (R., Vol. 4, pp. 781-85.) However, in response to Thompson Creek's objections, the 
W &SR Order contained provisions restricting the application and enforcement of the Agreement. 
(R., Vol. 4, pp. 782-83.) Critically important to the case before this Court, the W &SR Order 
contains the following restrictions: 
The (W&SR Agreement] is hereby approved, provided, that the provisions 
of paragraph 2 of the [Agreement] ("paragraph 2") that address 
administration of water rights are covenants among the signatory parties 
only and shall not be binding on this Court or non-signatory parties with 
regard to administration of water rights by IDWR. 
(R., Vol. 4, p. 782) (emphasis added). The Order goes on to provide that: 
The provisions of paragraph 2 [of the W&SR Agreement] shall not affect 
the rights of Thompson Creek or any other non-signatory party to 
participate in and object to any ... proceeding for creation of a water 
district ... ; nor shall the provisions of paragraph 2 affect the disposition 
or review of such proceedings. 
(R., Vol. 4, pp. 782-83) (emphasis added). 
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3. Next Step: The Director's Creation Of WDl 70 
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the W &SR Agreement, the Department took the first 
procedural step toward creating WDl 70 when it filed a motion for "interim administration" with 
the SRBA Court on May 13, 2005. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 371-80.) Generally speaking, interim 
administration is an intermediate step that may be requested by the Department after water rights 
within a particular area have been adjudicated, but before creation of a water district. See 
LC.§ 42-1417. It allows the Department to administer water rights much as a watermaster 
would do if a water district were already in place. See id. at §§ 42-607, 42-1417(1 ). However, 
as will be discussed more fully in this Brief, legal standards for interim administration are less 
stringent than those for the formation of a water district. And, interim administration does not 
actually provide a basis for creating a water district. The Department's request for interim 
administration was unopposed, and the SRBA Court approved the motion for interim 
administration on September 29, 2005. (R., Vol. II, pp. 457-60.) 
During this period, the Department coordinated meetings of the WDl 70 Steering 
Committee, composed of Department representatives and local water users. This Committee 
convened on September 13, 2005; October 4, 2005; and December 14, 2005. (R., Vol. 3, 
pp. 425,461, 490.) At these meetings, the Committee members (including Department 
personnel) discussed the purpose and background ofWDI 70, general responsibilities and 
activities of a water district, the organization, governance, and financing ofWDI 70, and related 
issues. (R., Vol. 3, pp. 425-29, 461-66, 490-92.) 
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On November 9, 2005, the Director conducted the statutorily required hearing regarding 
creation ofWDl 70. At the hearing, five individuals testified, none of whom expressed support 
for WDl 70. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 348-61.) However, allegedly based on the hearing testimony and 
the rest of the administrative record, the Director issued the Final Order Creating Water District 
No. 170 on March 6, 2006. (R., Vol. 3, pp. 494-506.) Thompson Creek filed a Petition for 
Reconsideration of the Final Order Creating Water District No. 170 on March 17, 2006. 
(R., Vol. 3, pp. 536-51.) In response, the Director issued an Amended Final Order Creating 
Water District No. 170 on April 6, 2006 (the "WDl 70 Order"). (R., Vol. 3, pp. 565-81.) 
Thompson Creek timely filed its petition for judicial review with the district court on 
May 1, 2006. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Given this legal context and the factual background previously described, the issues to be 
decided on appeal are: 
(1) Whether the Director's failure to record and provide a transcript of the entire 
hearing regarding the creation ofWDl 70 violates Due Process principles and 
provisions of the Idaho AP A; 
(2) Whether the Director was biased in favor of creating WD 170, in violation of Due 
Process principles and provisions of the Idaho AP A; 
(3) Whether the Director's representations to the public that he was required to create 
WD 170 pursuant to a previous agreement violate Due Process principles and 
provisions of the Idaho AP A; 
(4) Whether the agency record contains substantial evidence that WDI 70 is "required 
in order to properly administer uses of the water resource," as mandated by Idaho 
Code Section 42-604 and provisions of the Idaho APA; 
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(5) Whether inclusion of Thompson Creek within WDl 70 violates contract principles 
and therefore violates provisions of the Idaho APA; 
( 6) Whether Thompson Creek is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 12-117 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. 
III. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Thompson Creek is claiming attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-117 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides this Court 
with the statutory authority to award attorney fees "in any administrative or civil proceeding 
involving as adverse parties a state agency ... and a person." LC. § 12-117(1 ). Such an award 
acts "as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action" and provides "a remedy for persons 
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or 
attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should have made." Reardon v. Magic Valley 
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340,343 (2004) (quoting Bogner v. State 
Dep 't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854,859,693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984)). 
To determine whether an award of attorney fees under Section 12-117 is appropriate, the 
Court must (I) find a prevailing party, and (2) find that the other party "acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." Id.; see also, Reardon, 140 Idaho at 118, 90 P.3d at 343. 
"Where an agency has no authority to take a particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law." Id. at 120, 90 P.3d at 345. See also, Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada County Bd. of 
Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 808,812, 153 P.3d 1154 (2007) (awarding attorney fees under§ 12-117 
because county had no authority to take action on an indigency application "without first 
fulfilling the procedural requirements set forth in the medical indigency statutes"). 
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Here, the Director "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law" because he did not 
have the authority to create WD 170 without meeting the necessary procedural requirements. The 
Director violated Thompson Creek's Due Process rights and made a decision that is not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record. Thompson Creek brought these issues to the 
attention of the Director during the original administrative proceedings, which the Director 
summarily rejected. Because the Director acted outside of his authority in the creation of 
WD170, the Court should award attorney fees to Thompson Creek ifit is successful on this 
appeal. 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A successful challenge of the Director's administrative order under the Idaho AP A 
requires Thompson Creek to prevail on two points. See, e.g., Barron v. Idaho Dep 't of Water 
Res., 135 Idaho 414,417, 18 P.3d 219,222 (Idaho 2001). First, Thompson Creek must 
demonstrate the Department violated a standard in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3). Id. In this 
case, Thompson Creek must demonstrate that the Department's actions were: 
(!) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or 
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; or 
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or 
(4) Not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(5) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
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Second, Thompson Creek must demonstrate that its substantial rights have been 
prejudiced by the Department's action. LC.§ 67-5279(4). 
This Court has free review of issues of Jaw and is in no way bound by any of the legal 
conclusions of the district court. See, e.g., Worthington v. Thomas, 134 Idaho 433,435 4 P.3d 
545, 547 (2000) (the Idaho Supreme Court "freely reviews issues oflaw"); V-1 Oil Company v. 
Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 134 Idaho 716, 718, 9 P.3d 519,521 (2000) (the Idaho Supreme Court 
"reviews a lower court's statutory interpretation de nova" and "[b]ecause constitutional questions 
are purely questions oflaw, they are also reviewed de nova"); Basic American, Inc. v. Shatila, 
133 Idaho 726, 733-34, 992 P.2d 175, 182-83 (1999) (Idaho Supreme Court "is not bound by 
legal conclusions of the trial court and is free to draw its own legal conclusions from the facts 
presented"). In addition, this Court has free review over whether an agency's statutory 
interpretation should be afforded deference. See, e.g., Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 
141 Idaho 388,398, 111 P.3d 73, 83 (2005). 
v. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Director's Failure To Transcribe The Entire Hearing Violates Idaho Statutory 
Requirements And Due Process Principles 
Pursuant to the Idaho AP A, an agency action is in error if it is "in violation 
of ... statutory provisions," or if it is "made upon unlawful procedure." LC. § 67-5279(3)(a), 
(c). Idaho statute specifically requires the entire administrative hearing to be recorded by that 
agency. LC.§ 67-5242(3)(d). The failure to do so is a violation ofldaho statute and constitutes 
unlawful procedure and is, therefore, a violation of the Idaho AP A. 
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In addition, pursuant to the Idaho AP A, an agency action is in error if it is "in violation of 
constitutional ... provisions." LC. § 67-5279(3)(a). Both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions guarantee that no party shall be deprived of its property "without due process of 
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I; IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 13. Under Idaho law, water rights 
are entitled to Due Process protection, including during the creation of a water district. Nettleton 
v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 90, 94,558 P.2d 1048, 1051, 1055 (Idaho 1977). 
Simply put, the Director did not record the entire hearing regarding the creation of 
WDl 70 and therefore violated the Idaho APA and the Due Process clauses. The public notice 
provided by the Department regarding the WDl 70 hearing plainly states that the hearing was to 
take place at "7:00 PM, November 9, 2005 at the Challis High School Cafeteria .... " (R., 
Vol. 3, p. 467) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Director specifically stated at the hearing that, 
"ft/his meeting began shortly after 7:00 p.m .... " (R., Vol. 2, p. 350, L. 8) (emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, the Director ''went on the record at approximately 8: 10 p.m." (R., Vol. 2, 
p. 350, LL. 7-8.) Accordingly, based upon the Director's own testimony, there were at least 70 
unrecorded minutes of the hearing that are not a part of the hearing transcript. And, the Director 
has judicially admitted that this unrecorded portion included a description of the "factors he 
considered in proposing to establish the Upper Salmon Water District and answering questions 
about the establishment of the district and how it was envisioned to function." (R., Vol. 5, 
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pp. 895, 902.) This is a plain violation of Section 67-5242(3)(d) which unequivocally states that 
the Director "[ s ]hall cause the hearing to be recorded .... "4 
In addition to violating Section 67-5242(3)(d), the Department's action violated the Due 
Process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Idaho case law has specifically stated that 
"a transcribable record [is] indispensable to meaningful judicial review," and that "the keeping of 
a transcribable record" is one of the procedural requirements that collectively "comprise a 
common core of procedural due process requirements .... " Gay v. County Comm 'rs of 
Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,629,651 P.2d 560, 563 (Idaho App. 1982). While Gay was 
decided in the context of a zoning proceeding, the court's statements apply equally to state 
administrative agency proceedings, as both are subject to Due Process. 
While Idaho appellate courts apparently have not specifically described the standards that 
govern the adequacy of a hearing transcript, at least one federal court of appeals has stated that 
"[w]hether the transcript is inadequate depends upon the materiality of the omissions." McGlone 
v. Heckler, 791 F.2d 1119, 1120 (4th Cir. 1986). The Director admitted the unrecorded portion 
of the hearing includes a discussion of the factors he considered in proposing to establish 
WDl 70. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 895, 902.) Therefore, that portion of the hearing was certainly 
"material." 
4 Significantly, this Court has previously reversed the Department for violating the 
mandatory statutory due process requirements of Idaho law. In Nettleton, the Court reversed the 
Department's action combining two water districts because it totally failed to conduct the 
mandatory hearing. In its holding, the Court admonished the Department to follow the due 
process requirements ofldaho law. See Nettleton, 98 Idaho at 94. 
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Were this a situation in which the beginning of the hearing had been delayed 
until 8:10 p.m., this would excuse the Director's failure to go on the record until that time. That 
was not the case. Both the public notice announcing the hearing and the Director's direct 
testimony establish that the hearing commenced at 7:00 p.m. Therefore, the proceedings 
between 7:00 p.m. and 8: 10 p.m. were required to be recorded and transcribed. They were not. 
The Director violated state law. 
This violation prejudiced Thompson Creek by depriving it of the ability to discover and 
understand all of the "factors" considered by the Director in creating WDl 70. More critically, it 
deprives Thompson Creek of"meaningful judicial review" because there is no way for this Court 
to determine what additional evidence was presented during that 70 minute span or what 
additional Due Process violations occurred, if any. 
B. The Director's Belief That Creation Of WDI 70 Was Required By A Previous 
Agreement Deprived Thompson Creek Of Its Due Process Rights 
The Idaho AP A mandates that an agency action is in error if it is "in violation of ... 
constitutional provisions" or ifit is "made upon unlawful procedure." LC.§ 67-5279(3)(a), (c). 
Both the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions guarantee that no party shall be deprived of its property 
"without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. Again, 
under Idaho law, water rights are entitled to Due Process protection. Nettleton, 98 Idaho at 90, 
558 P.2d at 1051. 
When he created WD 170, the Director believed the W &SR Agreement required him to 
create WD 170, regardless of whether the administrative record demonstrated a legitimate need 
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for it. This violated Due Process requirements in two ways. First, it rendered the Director a 
biased decision-maker. Second, it deprived water users of the opportunity to provide meaningful 
input regarding the creation ofWDl 70. This error prejudiced Thompson Creek because it 
deprived Thompson Creek of a fair opportunity to have its concerns about WDl 70 considered in 
a meaningful way. Because the Director's creation ofWDl 70 violated Due Process 
requirements and was made upon unlawful procedure, his actions also violated the Idaho AP A. 
1. The State Of Idaho Did Not Have Authority To Require The Director To 
Create A New Water District At The Time Of The W&SR Agreement 
As discussed more fully below, the Director's primary justification for creating WDI 70 
is the W&SR Agreement. Paragraph 2 of that Agreement states the Department "will establish a 
water district for the Upper Salmon River Basin." (R., Vol. 4, pp. 712, 715.) However, at the 
time it executed the W &SR Agreement, the State of Idaho did not have the authority to 
unilaterally create, or agree to create, WD 170. Rather, at most, the state had authority to require 
the Director to initiate proper administrative proceedings to determine whether creating the new 
water district was legally justified under applicable Idaho statutes. 
The Department, as a state administrative agency, has only those powers specifically 
granted by the Idaho Legislature. This Court specifically addressed the powers of the 
Department by stating, "[ a ]n administrative agency like the [Department] has only such powers 
as the statute or ordinance confers .... " Beker Indus. Inc. v. Georgetown Irrigation Dist., 101 
Idaho 187,191,610 P.2d 546,550 (Idaho 1980) (citations omitted). This Court has also stated 
that, "[ a ]n administrative agency is a creature of statute, limited to the power and authority 
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granted it by the Legislature and may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, or 
enlarge the legislative act which it administers." Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513,514, 
915 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Idaho 1996). 
By its express terms, Section 42-604 only allows the Director to create a new water 
district when he has determined, after notice and a hearing in compliance with statutory and 
Due Process requirements, that the new district is "required in order to properly administer uses 
of the water resource." LC.§ 42-604, ,i,i 2, 3; see also Nettleton, 98 Idaho at 94,558 P.2d 
at 1055 ( confirming that the combining of two separate water districts into one water district 
requires notice, a hearing, and adherence to procedural due process). At the time of the W&SR 
Agreement, there had not yet been any notice or hearing on creation of a water district, as 
required by Section 42-604. Accordingly, the Director could not have been required to actually 
create WDI 70 at that time, regardless of the wording of the W&SR Agreement. State Jaw did 
not authorize him to do so at that point. 
2. Due Process Requires An Unbiased Decision-Maker 
As this Brief has already explained, water rights are entitled to Due Process protections in 
Idaho, including during the creation of a water district. And, as this Court has recognized, "[t]he 
Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal." Eacret v. 
Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494,498 (Idaho 2004) (citing Marshall v. Jerrica, 
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (I 980)). An administrative agency violates these Due Process 
requirements if it "is 'not capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its 
own circumstances."' Eacret, 139 Idaho at 785, 86 P .3d at 499 (quoting Hortonville Joint Sch. 
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Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass 'n, 426 U.S. 482,493 (1941)). More specifically, the agency 
action is invalid if prehearing statements by the decision-maker demonstrate that (i) the 
decision-maker "has made up his or her mind regarding the facts and will not listen to the 
evidence with an open mind," (ii) the decision-maker "will not apply the existing law,'' or 
(iii) the decision-maker "has already made up his or her mind regarding the outcome of the 
hearing." Eacret, 139 Idaho at 785-86, 86 P.3d at 499-500 (emphasis added). 
This Court has illustrated the operation of these principles in its Eacret opinion. In 
Eacret, landowners on Lake Pend Oreille applied to Bonner County for a variance from setback 
requirements in order to build a boathouse. Eacret, 139 Idaho at 782, 86 P.3d at 496. 
Ultimately, after an appeal from a denial by the Planning and Zoning Commission, the Board of 
County Commissioners approved the variance. Id. Prior to the hearing before the Board, 
however, one of the Board members indicated his belief that variances for boathouses such as the 
one contemplated by the application should be approved by stating, among other things, that "we 
need to grant these variances." 139 Idaho at 785, 786, 86 P.3d at 499, 500. 
Based upon these statements, together with some ex parte communications between the 
same Board member and the applicants, the Court upheld the district court's finding of improper 
bias because it appeared that the Board member had already made up his mind on the variance 
application prior to the hearing. 139 Idaho at 786, 86 P.3d at 500. In doing so, the court 
specifically noted that there are two purposes of these Due Process requirements: (1) to reduce 
the chance of an unfair decision, and (2) to reduce the appearance of impropriety. 139 Idaho 
at 784, 86 P.3d at 498. See also Floyd v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 
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52 P.3d 863 (Idaho 2002) (finding bias based upon public statements made by a county 
commissioner, but also finding harmless error because the board vote was unanimous). 
The Eacret and Floyd cases demonstrate that having a biased decision maker necessarily 
violates Due Process. While in Floyd the bias was ultimately found to be harmless error, that 
reasoning does not apply in the case currently before this Court. Rather, the decision to create 
WDl 70 was that of one person: the Director. His vote was not the "swing" vote, it was the only 
vote. Accordingly, any biased decision on the part of the Director is necessarily a Due Process 
violation that cannot be upheld under a harmless error analysis. 
3. The Director Was A Biased Decision-Maker Because He Believed The 
W&SR Agreement Required Him To Create WD170 
With respect to the dispute currently before this Court, the administrative record 
demonstrates that the Director and other Department personnel believed the W&SR Agreement 
required them to create WD 170. Regardless of whether the Director may have acted in good 
faith throughout the administrative proceedings, his belief that he was required to create WD 170 
demonstrates that the Director "ha[d] already made up his ... mind regarding the outcome of the 
hearing,"which under Eacret, invalidates his action. 139 Idaho at 785-786, 86 P.3d at499-500. 
The administrative record is replete with statements made by Department personnel 
demonstrating their belief that the W &SR Agreement required the Director to form WD 170. 
For example, at the first WDI 70 Steering Committee meeting, Department employee Tim Luke 
presented slides specifically stating that, "IDWR must establish [the] Upper Salmon Water 
District." (R., Vol. 4, pp. 609,612) (emphasis added). Additional slides presented by the 
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Department's current Director David Tuthill at an October 24, 2005 public information meeting 
regarding the creation of WDl 70 also state that, pursuant to the W &SR Agreement, "IDWR 
must establish [the] Upper Salmon Water District." (R., Vol. 4, pp. 628, 635) ( emphasis added). 
Public testimony confirms these representations by the Department. Written testimony 
submitted to the Director by Mr. Jack Challis states that Director Tuthill and Department 
employee Tim Luke presented slides at the October 24 meeting "outlining the necessity for an 
Upper Salmon Water District Watermaster to oversee this new district." (R., Vol. 3, 
pp. 485, 486) ( emphasis added). According to Mr. Challis, those slides described the new water 
district as an "obligation ... to which [the Department] must comply in order to meet conditions 
of the Wild & Scenic Rivers Agreement .... " Id. (emphasis added). Based on these 
representations, the Director and the Department cannot reasonably deny their belief that they 
were required to create WD 170 by the W &SR Agreement. They also cannot deny that these 
representations had convinced affected water users that creation of WD 170 was required. 
There are other examples in the administrative record demonstrating the Director's belief 
that the W &SR Agreement required him to create WDl 70. Finding of Fact 4 in the WDl 70 
Order describes the two Salmon River water rights that the Forest Service obtained in the SRBA 
pursuant to the Wild & Scenic Rivers Act. (R., Vol. 3, pp. 565, 566.) If the Director was not 
relying upon the W &SR Agreement when he created WD 170, there would be no need for this 
reference to appear in the WD 170 Order. This information is otherwise irrelevant to whether a 
new water district is required in Basins 71 and 72-areas that do not actually encompass the two 
Forest Service Salmon River water rights, which are located many miles farther downstream. 
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These examples demonstrate that the Director had already decided to create WD 170 prior 
to the hearing on the matter. This rendered him a biased decision-maker under Eacret because 
he "[h]ad already made up his ... mind regarding the outcome of the hearing." 139 Idaho 
at 785-786, 86 P .3d at 499-500. Under Eacret, this is a Due Process violation. 
While this Court has stated that the right to an unbiased decision maker "does not mean 
having 'no preconceptions on legal issues,'" it has also stated that the decision maker must be 
"willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions, and remain [] open to persuasion, 
when the issues arise in a pending case." Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 
Idaho 203,209, 159 P.3d 840,846 (2007) (citation omitted). The record in this matter certainly 
does not demonstrate that the Director was "open to persuasion" on the propriety of creating 
WDl 70. As this Brief will demonstrate below, nearly all of the testimony at the hearing was 
against the creation of WD 170. 
There is another reason the Director's predetermination violated Due Process. This 
premature determination materially and improperly prejudiced the subsequent administrative 
proceedings, because the water user public did not have any incentive to provide input to the 
Department during the administrative process. As the public testimony demonstrates, to the 
members of the public and the affected water users, creation of the new water district was 
already an inevitability based on the Department's statements, and the hearing and solicitation of 
feedback was simply a meaningless formality.' 
5 Meaningful participation by "all interested persons" in a water district hearing is 
essential to satisfy due process. See Nettleton, 98 Idaho at 94, 558 P.2d at 1055. There is no 
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A good example of this chilling effect appears in the hearing transcript itself. During his 
testimony at the hearing, Mr. Jack Challis testified that, "the majority realize, like it or not, the 
now finalized Wild and Scenic Rivers Agreement has made this proposed new district 
mandatory." (R., Vol. 2, p. 352, LL. 62-64) (emphasis added). (See also, R., Vol. 3, pp. 485-
86) (describing WDl 70 as an "obligation ... to which [the Department] must comply in order to 
meet conditions of the Wild & Scenic Rivers Agreement"). 
According to his testimony, Mr. Challis is not only a water right owner, but also the 
secretary-treasurer for two water districts and both a former and current watermaster. 
(R., Vol. 2, p. 351, LL. 34-38.) His experience provided Mr. Challis with a level of 
sophistication in Idaho water law above most water right owners. If Mr. Challis was under the 
impression that WDl 70 is indeed "mandatory," how many other non-testifying water right 
owners were operating under the same erroneous assumption? How many would have testified 
or commented on the need for the new water district had they known it was not in fact 
mandatory? Unfortunately, we will never know, because the Department consistently asserted 
that the creation ofWD! 70 was "mandatory," as Mr. Challis stated. (R., Vol. 2, p. 352, L. 64.) 
The misinformation consistently disseminated by the Department unquestionably tainted the 
process and cast a cloud of inevitability over the statutory procedure which mandates openness, 
fairness, and objectivity. 
way of determining how many "interested persons" did not testify because of the misinformation 
disseminated by Department personnel that the W &SR Agreement required the Director to create 
WD170. 
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C. The Administrative Record Does Not Contain Substantial Evidence That WD170 Is 
"Required In Order To Properly Administer Uses Of The Water Resource" 
Pursuant to the Idaho AP A, an agency action is in error if it is "not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole." LC.§ 67-5279(3)(d). Under Idaho law, a water 
district may be created only when it is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water 
resource." I.C. § 42-604 ,r 2. Accordingly, in order to uphold the Director's decision, this Court 
must find substantial evidence in the record that WDI 70 was in fact "required in order to 
properly administer uses of the water resource." 
However, the administrative record contains virtually no such evidence. Rather, the 
primary bases relied upon by the Director are either not relevant to the determination required by 
Section 42-604 or are conclusory statements unsupported by record evidence. As such, the 
Director's decision is not "supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole" and, 
therefore, is in error under the Idaho APA. LC. § 67-5279(3)(d). This error prejudiced 
Thompson Creek, because it results in the creation ofWDl 70--an action which Thompson 
Creek opposes due in part to the extra costs that will be required to fund WD 170 operations. 
1. The Director Improperly Relied Upon Several Items In Creating WD170 
The Director justified creating WD 170 by relying upon several items not relevant to the 
mandatory standard in Section 42-604. Similarly, the Director relied upon factual statements not 
supported by the administrative record. Accordingly, before discussing the evidence in the 
record that is relevant to the determination required by Section 42-604, it is important to discuss 
the items that should not have been considered in that determination. 
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a. The Director Improperly Relied Upon The W&SR Agreement 
This Brief has already established the Director believed the W&SR Agreement required 
him to create WDI 70. Importantly, the provision in the W&SR Agreement "requiring" the 
Department to create WD 170 is not relevant to whether the new water district is "required" 
pursuant to Section 42-604, ,i 2. The Director did not have the authority to create WD 170 prior 
to completing the statutorily required administrative process. And, the fact that the State of 
Idaho "agreed" to create the new water district in the W &SR Agreement is not the type of 
"requirement" contemplated by Section 42-604. In order to create a new water district, the 
Director must demonstrate that it is "required" for the proper administration of the water 
resource, not that it is required pursuant to an agreement executed prior to the mandated 
statutory administrative process. See I.C. § 42-604, ,i 2. Accordingly, the provision of the 
W &SR Agreement "requiring" the Department to create WDI 70 is not rc:cord evidence 
supporting the Director's formation of the new water district. 
In addition to this statutory argument, terms of the W&SR Agreement itself demonstrate 
that the Agreement is not relevant to whether the creation ofWDI 70 is legal and appropriate.' 
For example, Paragraph 9(b) of the Agreement states that, "nothing in this Stipulation ... shall 
be construed or interpreted ... to limit or affect the authority of ... the State provided by statute 
or regulation." (R., Vol. 4, p. 728) (emphasis added). Moreover, Paragraph 10 provides that, 
"nothing in this Stipulation ... shall be ... used as evidence ... in any appellate proceedings 
6 Again, Thompson Creek is not a party to that Agreement and is accordingly not 
obligated by its terms. 
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concerning the SRBA, or in any other proceeding, other than those seeking approval of the 
[W&SR Order], for interpretation, enforcement or administration of this Stipulation or the Partial 
Decrees .... " (R., Vol. 4, pp. 728-29.) This wording was specifically confirmed by the SRBA 
Court in the W&SR Order. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 781, 783.) 
In other words, the W &SR Agreement contains specific provisions restricting its use in 
subsequent proceedings. These provisions conclusively preserve the applicability of 
Section 42-604 and its statement that a new water district must be "required in order to properly 
administer uses of the water resource." Accordingly, the W &SR Agreement's "requirement" 
that the Director create WD 170 is not relevant. 
Significantly, the Director also could not properly rely upon the W &SR Agreement in 
creating WD 170 because the SRBA Court's W &SR Order approving the Agreement specifically 
prohibits the Director from relying on the water administration provisions in Paragraph 2 of the 
Agreement in determining whether a new water district is "required" pursuant to Section 42-604. 
In its order approving the W&SR Agreement, the SRBA Court specifically states that: 
The [W &SR Agreement] is hereby approved, provided, that the provisions 
of paragraph 2 of the [Agreement] ("paragraph 2") that address 
administration of water rights are covenants among the signatory parties 
only and shall not be binding on this Court or non-signatory parties with 
regard to administration of water rights by IDWR. 
(R., Vol. 4, p. 782) (emphasis added). That Order goes on to provide that: 
The provisions of paragraph 2 [of the W&SR Agreement] shall not affect 
the rights of Thompson Creek or any other non-signatory party to 
participate in and object to any ... proceeding for creation of a water 
district. .. ; nor shall the provisions of paragraph 2 affect the disposition 
or review of such proceedings. 
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(R., Vol. 4, pp. 782-83) (emphasis added). 
This language explicitly establishes that the W &SR Agreement may not provide a basis 
for forming a new water district, and that the creation of WD 170 must still be "required" 
pursuant to Section 42-604, ,r 2. 
b. The Director Improperly Relied Upon The Previous Adjudication Of 
Water Rights 
When he created WDl 70, the Director incorrectly believed the previous adjudication of 
water rights within Basins 71 and 72 justified the creation of a water district in those areas. 
However, the previous adjudication of water rights is simply a prerequisite to-not a justification 
for-water district formation. 
Conclusion of Law 20 of the WD 170 Order states that, "Idaho Code § 42-604 authorizes 
the Director to create a water district for streams or water supplies for which a court having 
jurisdiction thereof has adjudicated the priorities of appropriation." (R., Vol. 3, p. 575) 
( emphasis added). This statement implies that, by itself, the adjudication of water rights in 
Basins 71 and 72 is a sufficient basis for the Director to create a new water district. However, 
this is not the correct construction of the water district statutes. 
While adjudication of water rights may be a required prerequisite to creation of a water 
district under Section 42-604, it does not provide the Director with the authority to create a new 
water district. Rather, the creation ofWDl 70 must still be "required in order to properly 
administer uses of the water resource." LC. § 42-604, ,r 2 ( emphasis added). Adjudication of 
water rights alone is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory criteria for creation of a water district. 
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More is needed. Otherwise, the language of Section 42-604 serves no purpose. Under 
the Director's interpretation, adjudication of water rights automatically justifies creation of a 
water district. If the Legislature had intended such a process, the statutes would so provide. 
They do not. Instead, the Legislature established a standard that must be satisfied to create a 
water district: it must be "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource." 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
c. The Director Improperly Relied Upon Interim Administration 
A similar analysis applies to the Director's reliance upon interim administration to justify 
creating WDl 70. Interim administration allows the Department to distribute water and protect 
senior water rights in a particular basin after water rights have been adjudicated, but before the 
Director has determined whether a water district is required. See, generally, I.C. § 42-1417. As 
its name implies, it is an "interim" measure and is subject to a relaxed standard compared to the 
formation of a water district. A water district must be "required." I.C. § 42-604, ,r 2. Interim 
administration need only be "reasonably necessary." Id. at§ 42-1417(2)(c). 
Conclusion of Law 23 of the WDl 70 Order states that, "Idaho Code§ 42-1417 ... 
clearly authorizes the Director to create a water district after the entry of the district court's order 
for interim administration .... " (R., Vol. 3, p. 575.) This statement incorrectly implies that 
interim administration alone is sufficient to form a water district. If a water district is to be 
formed after interim administration is judicially approved, the district still must be "required" 
pursuant to Section 42-604. The interim administration statute states that, "[a]fter entry of the 
district court's order for interim administration, the director may form a water district pursuant 
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to chapter 6, title 42, Idaho Code." LC. § 42-1417( 4) ( emphasis added). This provision 
specifically incorporates the "required" standard of Section 42-604. Section 42-1417( 4)'s 
statement that the Director may form a water district, "[a]fter entry of the district court's order 
for interim administration," does not provide the Director with independent authority to form a 
water district as the Director implies. Instead, Section 42-1417 simply describes the sequence of 
events that may occur if the statutorily mandated due process procedures are properly completed. 
d. The Director Improperly Relied Upon Matters Outside The 
Administrative Record 
In creating WDl 70, the Director may not rely upon his own conclusory statements of 
fact, unsupported by the administrative record. The Idaho AP A specifically provides that, 
"[f]indings of fact must be based exclusively on the evidence in the record of the contested case 
and on matters officially noticed in that proceeding." LC.§ 67-5248(2) (emphasis added). And, 
the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically stated that, "[a]ny findings made by [an administrative 
agency] based on matters outside the record must be reversed as unsupported by substantial, 
competent evidence or as arbitrary and capricious." Laurino v. Bd. of Prof'! Discipline of Idaho 
State Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 596,601, 51 P.3d 410,415 (Idaho 2002); see also Sanders Orchard 
v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695, 702, 52 P.3d 840,847 (Idaho 2002). The WD170 Order 
demonstrates the Director relied heavily upon factual statements unsupported by the 
administrative record. 
To be clear, the Department may rely upon its water resource expertise in administrative 
proceedings. Administrative agencies are expressly permitted by Idaho law to take official 
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notice of matters that are within their area of expertise. However, to take notice of such matters, 
an agency is required to notify the parties to the proceeding of the facts or material to be noticed, 
before or during the hearing, and prior to any order based on the noticed facts. 
LC.§§ 67-5249(2)(c); 67-5251(4). See also Sanders, 137 Idaho at 702, 52 P.3d at 847 (holding 
that an unsupported finding of fact that a proposed subdivision was in an area of increasing 
residential development was not supported by substantial evidence). 
Here, the Director did not officially notice any factual matters prior to or during the 
hearing. Accordingly, the Director may not rely upon factual matters discussed in the WDJ 70 
Order unsupported by substantial evidence in the administrative record. An administrative 
agency: 
may not use its expertise as a substitute for evidence in the record, since 
the requirement for administrative decisions based on substantial evidence 
and reasoned findings-which provide the basis for effective judicial 
review-would become meaningless if material facts known to or relied 
upon the agency did not appear in the record. 
Laurino, 137 Idaho at 602, 51 P.3d at 416 (footnotes omitted). 
Importantly, the WDJ 70 Order is full of examples of the Director's reliance upon factual 
matters not contained in the administrative record. For example, Conclusion of Law 7 in the 
WD 170 Order states that the Director specifically relied upon "historic records of the water 
districts in Basins 72, 73, 74, and 75 on file at the Department" in concluding that "some or 
many of the statutory requirements are not being satisfied [in the Upper Salmon River Basin]." 
(R., Vol. 3, p. 572.) Conclusion of Law 7 also lists conduct that purportedly justifies creation of 
the water district. It states: 
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For example, surface water diversions in some of the existing districts lack 
adequate measuring devices and controlling headgates, are not measured 
or recorded on a regular basis, or are not monitored or regulated during 
portions of the irrigation season. Additionally, some of the existing water 
districts do not maintain adequate measurement records, annual 
watermaster reports are not always complete or timely submitted, and 
some existing water districts have been inactive for many years. None of 
the existing water districts enforce limitations of surface water rights 
outside of the irrigation season for the rights, and none of the existing 
water districts regulate water rights diverting from ground water. 
(R., Vol. 3, p. 572.) 
The Director made similar statements regarding the effectiveness of the existing water 
districts within Basin 72 in Finding of Fact 12 of the WD170 Order. (R., Vol. 3, p. 567.) 
Moreover, Conclusion of Law 8 in the WD170 Order states that, "the administration of surface 
water rights in the existing water districts in Basin 72 is often inconsistent." (R., Vol. 3, p. 572.) 
Remarkably, the Director did not officially notice any of this factual information pursuant 
to Section 67-5251, and there is no factual support for these assertions in the administrative 
record. Such conclusory, unsupported statements do not provide the Director with a legitimate 
basis for creating the water district. 
2. The Remainder Of The Record Must Contain Substantial Evidence That A 
New Water District Is "Required In Order To Properly Administer Uses Of 
The Water Resource" 
The applicable standard, Section 42-604, unambiguously states that creation of a water 
district must be "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource." 
LC.§ 42-604, ,r 2 (emphasis added). However, the WDl 70 Order specifically states that, "[t]he 
Director proposes creation of a water district in Basins 71 and 72 for efficient administration of 
surface and ground water rights." (R., Vol. 3, p. 575) ( emphasis added). This wrongly 
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characterizes the statutory standard. Simply promoting "efficient administration" does not 
satisfy the statutory mandate of Section 42-604. And, even if it did, there is simply no evidence 
in the record supporting the assertion that WDl 70 will promote "efficient administration." 
The statute's use of the term "required" is deliberate. The Idaho Legislature determined 
that creation of water districts would result in the imposition of significant costs and restrictions 
on water users. It used the term "required" to ensure these governmental burdens would not be 
imposed unless there was a legitimate, demonstrated imperative. It is not sufficient that a water 
district may make the administration of water rights more efficient. Had the Legislature intended 
a lower standard to govern the creation of water districts or to give the Director more discretion 
in this determination, it would have done so. See, e.g., LC. §§ 42-237a ("the director of the 
department of water resources in his sole discretion, is empowered .... ") (emphasis added), 
42-247 ("[t]he director of the department may also in his discretion give notice .... ") (emphasis 
added); see also I.C. §§ 42-351(3), 42-502, 42-1701A(2), 42-2013. Rather, as Section 42-604 
unambiguously states, a new water district must be "required in order to properly administer 
uses of the water resource." (Emphasis added). 
Significantly, the Department should not be entitled to any deference on the interpretation 
of Section 42-604 pursuant to the Idaho cases addressing judicial deference to an agency's 
interpretation of statutes it administers.' Those cases hold an agency's interpretation of statutes 
7 Notably, this is not the first time this Court has addressed the legality of the 
Department's interpretation and implementation of the water district statutes. In DeRousse v. 
Higginson, this Court rejected the Department's attempt to administer unadjudictated water 
rights through water districts. 95 Idaho 173, 505 P.2d 321 (1973). The Department took the 
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is entitled to deference only when the statute is ambiguous. See, e.g., Matter of Permit 
No. 36-7200 in Name of Idaho Dep't of Parks and Recreation, 121 Idaho 819,824,828 P.2d 
848, 853 (Idaho 1992). Section 42-604 is unambiguous in its statement that the creation of a 
new water district must be "required." Any interpretation of that statute involving a standard less 
exacting than "required" contradicts the unambiguously expressed intent of the Idaho Legislature 
and is accordingly not entitled to any judicial deference. 8 
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court concluded that Section 42-604 is an 
ambiguous statute. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 986, 988-90.) According to the district court, the word 
"required" used in that statute "yields multiple meanings upon which reasonable minds may 
differ," because the Merriam Webster dictionary contains multiple definitions of that term which 
differ as to their degree of necessity. (R., Vol. 5, pp. 989-90.) Thompson Creek believes this 
conclusion of ambiguity is in error. 
First, it is important to note that "(a]mbiguity is not established merely because the 
parties present differing [statutory] interpretations to the court." State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 
471,476, 163 P.3d 1183, 1188 (2007) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the fact that Thompson 
position that it could administer unadjudicated water rights, despite the fact that the Idaho 
Legislature had recently revised the water district statutes to exclude unadjudicated water rights. 
95 Idaho at 175,505 P.2d at 323. In Nettleton v. Higginson, this Court rejected the Department's 
attempt to combine two water districts into one water district without undergoing the required 
notice and hearing process. 98 Idaho at 94,558 P.2d at 1055. 
8 Additionally, the Director has the authority to adopt administrative rules and 
regulations interpreting statutory enactments. LC.§§ 42-603, 42-1805(8). He has neglected to 
utilize that authority here and is therefore not entitled to "Chevron-style deference" in his 
interpretation of Section 42-604. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,587 (2000). 
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Creek and the Director offer differing interpretations of Section 42-604 does not necessarily 
mean that the statute is ambiguous. 
In addition, the fact that the term "required" has multiple definitions that vary as to the 
degree of necessity should not be sufficient to establish ambiguity. Thompson Creek submits 
that virtually every statute contains words that are capable of multiple, similar definitions that 
differ only as to degree. Surely, something more is required to establish that a statute is 
ambiguous. As this Court has recognized, "a statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute 
mind can devise more than one interpretation of it." Matter of Permit No. 36-7200 in the Name 
of the Idaho Dept. of Parks and Recreation, 121 Idaho 819,823,828 P.2d 848,852 (1992). 
Even assuming the district court is correct that "required" in Section 42-604 means "as 
suitable" or "as appropriate," this does not end the analysis. As Thompson Creek will explain, 
there is a fundamental lack of evidence in the record that WO 170 is "required" for proper water 
administration purposes, regardless of which particular variation of the definition of"required" is 
used. 
3. The Remainder Of The Administrative Record Does Not Contain Substantial 
Evidence That WD 170 Is Required 
Under Section 67-5279(3)(d), the Director's decision must be supported by "substantial 
and competent evidence." Chisholm v. Idaho Dep 't of Water Res., 142 Idaho 159, 125 P.3d 515, 
518 (Idaho 2005). This evidence must be "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion." 142 Idaho at 159, 125 P.3d at 520 (citation omitted). This 
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evidence need not constitute a preponderance of the evidence, but it must be "more than a mere 
scintilla." Id. ( citation omitted). 
The record in this case simply does not contain "substantial and competent evidence" that 
a water district is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource." And, the 
hearing transcript provides virtually no support for the contention that a new water district is 
"required" for this purpose. 
To the contrary, most testimony at the hearing was against the creation ofWDl 70. Of 
the five witnesses testifying at the November 9, 2005 hearing, four of them specifically 
expressed their belief that the new water district was unnecessary. (R., Vol. 2, p. 352, 
LL. 61-62) ("many in this proposed district would question any actual needs for such actually 
exists" (testimony of Mr. Jack Challis)); (R., Vol. 2, p. 354, L. 113 -p. 355, L. 114) ("we feel 
that there is no need for the upper basin watermaster" (testimony of Mr. Jerry Hawkins)); 
(R., Vol. 2, p. 356, LL. 138-39) ("[i]t just isn't necessary to have another watermaster 
mastering something that isn't necessary" (testimony of Mr. Blair Kauer)); (R., Vol. 2, p. 357, 
L. 173 - p. 358, L. 185) ("in essence I can't see why we probably need anybody that we don't 
presently have in the system already . . . . I think we're way over emphasizing the need down the 
road for this fellow that's going to be requiring a lot of money to police us in essence" 
(testimony of Mr. James Whittaker)). And, the testimony of the fifth witness at the hearing did 
not specifically address the need for WDl 70. (R., Vol. 2, p. 358, L. 201 - p. 359, L. 222.) 
Moreover, the remainder of the administrative record contains no valid evidence that 
WDI 70 is "required" in accordance with Section 42-604. Rather, the "need" for WDI 70 is 
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based almost exclusively on the W &SR Agreement, adjudication, interim administration, and 
unsupported factual assertions-none of which are appropriate bases for the creation ofWDI 70, 
as this Brief has already explained. 
Thompson Creek specifically raised concerns regarding the lack of evidence in the record 
in its previous Petition for Reconsideration of Final Order Creating Water District No. 170. 
(R., Vol. 3, pp. 536-50.) In response to this specific concern raised by Thompson Creek, the 
Director does not describe, summarize, or explain any actual evidence of the need for WD170. 
Instead, he simply lists a number of documents that he claims support the creation ofWDl 70. 
(R., Vol. 3, p. 574.) If those documents contain factual evidence supporting the creation of 
WDl 70, the Director should have described that evidence in the WDl 70 Order to justify his 
decision and respond to Thompson Creek's concern. It is not sufficient to simply claim that 
certain documents support the Director's decision. The findings of fact and the decision must be 
based exclusively upon substantial evidence contained in the record. I.C. §§ 67-5248(2), 
67-5279(3)(d). Here, the Director simply did not even come close to satisfying these 
requirements. 
Significantly, the Department did not establish a legal need for WDI 70 based upon lack 
of enforcement authority without a new water district. To the contrary, the Department already 
has authority to enforce water rights in Basins 71 and 72 under Idaho law. The Idaho Legislature 
conferred general water right enforcement authority upon the Department. See, e.g., 
LC. §§ 42-1701B (granting the Director authority to pursue civil enforcement of violations of 
state water laws), 42-1805(9) (granting the Director authority to seek injunctive relief against 
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those violating state water laws). And, the Director routinely entertains water delivery calls by 
senior appropriators against junior appropriators. Accordingly, a water district is not the only 
means for the Department to ensure water is distributed in accordance with Idaho law; there are 
other legal avenues available. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court only made a passing reference to this 
argument, concluding after a brief two-sentence analysis that "[ s ]ubstantial evidence supported 
the Director's order .... " (R., Vol. 5, p. 992.) According to the court, "[t]he Director's 
Amended Final Order relied on the factual findings from [the Luke Affidavit], the hearing 
testimony, and written comments to reach its decision." Id. However, none of these three items 
actually support the creation ofWDl 70. 
First, as Thompson Creek has explained, nearly all of the "hearing testimony" was 
against the creation of WD 170. In addition, the only "written comments" submitted were those 
of the Morgan Creek Water District, expressing "concern" about WD170 (R., Vol. 3, 
pp. 488-89); and those of Thompson Creek (R., Vol. 4, pp. 638-44) and Jack Challis (R., Vol. 3, 
pp. 485-87)-both against the creation ofWDl 70. Therefore, under the district court's analysis, 
the Luke Affidavit is the only remaining item in the record potentially supporting the creation of 
WD 170. However, it is simply insufficient. 
In his response brief to the district court, the Director relies upon the following language 
from the Luke Affidavit to support his argument that the creation of WD 170 is supported by 
substantial evidence on the record: 
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The specific reasons for creation or enlargement of water districts in 
Basin 71 and 72 are: 
• Existing water districts in these basins are limited to surface water 
sources and do not include ground water sources. Additionally, 
some surface water sources in these basins may not be included in 
any water district. 
• All of the water rights claimed in Basins 71 and 72 have been 
reported or partially decreed in the SRBA as required under 
LC.§ 42-1417. 
• Some areas of the basins are in either water measurement districts 
or existing water districts, or no district at all. Certain rights and 
sources (primarily ground water) within water districts have not 
been subject to administration or regulation by the water district, 
and measurement districts are limited to measurement and 
reporting only, not regulation or enforcement of rights. 
• The establishment of water districts will provide watermasters with 
the ability to administer water rights in accordance with the prior 
appropriation doctrine as established by Idaho law. 
• The establishment of water districts will provide watermasters the 
means to protect senior water rights. 
(R., Vol. 5, pp. 895, 917.) 
Unfortunately for the Director, however, none of the quoted statements from the Luke 
Affidavit actually demonstrate a need for the creation ofWDI 70. In other words, those 
statements do not demonstrate that senior water rights are consistently being injured such that a 
water district is necessary to protect those rights. Neither do they establish that substantial water 
use conflicts have prompted water right holders to request the Department to impose creation of 
WDI 70 to "properly administer the uses of the water resource." This Court has stated, 
"[s]ubstantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept 
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to support a conclusion." Curtis v. M H. King Co., 142 Idaho 383, 385, 128 P.3d 920, 922 
(Idaho 2005) ( citations omitted). Simply put, the above-quoted statements from the Luke 
Affidavit do not contain "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support [the] 
conclusion" that a water district is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water 
resource." 
Rather, the purpose of the Luke Affidavit was to support the Department's 
commencement of interim administration in Basins 71 and 72. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 381-84.) As 
Thompson Creek has explained, the commencement of interim administration is subject to less 
stringent legal standards than is the creation of a water district. While the Luke Affidavit may 
have been sufficient to support interim administration, it simply does not provide any evidence 
that WD 170 is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water resource," as 
Section 42-604 mandates. 
To the contrary, the quoted passage from the Luke Affidavit actually highlights the lack 
of evidence in the record. It references the fact that some areas within Basins 71 and 72 are in 
"water measurement districts." (R., Vol. 2, p. 383.) Generally speaking, the Director can create 
a water measurement district in order to measure, catalog, and document water supplies and 
diversions within the district. LC. § 42-705. 
This begs the question: If the Department has the legal authority to measure water 
supplies and diversions, and given that some of the areas within Basins 71 and 72 are in fact 
within water measurement districts, then why is there no water measurement data in the record? 
Similarly, the record does not contain evidence of any requests from water users within 
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Basins 71 and 72 for increased water right administration or any documentation of water delivery 
calls that have been initiated in those basins. This is the type of information that the Director 
should have relied upon to demonstrate that creation ofWDl 70 is "required in order to properly 
administer uses of the water resource." However, no such evidence appears in the record. 
D. The Director's Decision To Include Thompson Creek In WD170 Is Arbitrary And 
Capricious Because Thompson Creek Was Not A Party To The W&SR Agreement 
This Brief has explained the total lack of evidence in the administrative record 
demonstrating that WD 170 is "required in order to properly administer uses of the water 
resource," as required by Sections 42-604 and 67-5279(3)(d) of the Idaho Code. In addition, this 
Brief demonstrates that the Director's sole basis for creating WD 170 is the W &SR Agreement. 
Under these circumstances, even if this Court upholds the Director's creation ofWDl 70, it 
should not subject Thompson Creek to the costs and other requirements of the water district. 
Again, Thompson Creek was not a party to the W &SR Agreement. In fact, in response 
to an objection filed by Thompson Creek, the SRBA Court's order approving the Agreement 
specifically provides that, "the provisions of paragraph 2 of the [W&SR Agreement] ... that 
address administration of water rights are covenants among the signatory parties only and shall 
not be binding on this Court or non-signatory parties with regard to administration of water 
rights by IDWR." (R., Vol. 4, p. 782) (emphasis added). Paragraph 2 of the Agreement is the 
provision that "requires" the Director to create WD! 70. (R., Vol. 4, pp. 714-15.) 
This Court has made clear, "[a] stipulation is a contract and its enforceability is 
determined by contract principles." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604,611, 114 
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P.3d 974, 981 (Idaho 2005) (citation omitted). Of course, a non-party is not bound by a contract. 
Because Thompson Creek was not a party to the W &SR Agreement, it is not legally bound by 
that Agreement and should not be subject to any of the water administration provisions that are a 
result of that Agreement, including WDJ 70. 
Pursuant to the Idaho AP A, an agency action is in error if it is "arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion." LC. § 67-5279(3)( e). Generally speaking, a decision is "arbitrary" if it is 
made "in disregard of the facts and circumstances presented" or "without adequate determining 
principles." American Lung Ass 'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dept. of Agriculture, 142 Idaho 
544, 547, 130 P.3d 1082, 1085 (Idaho 2006). Similarly, a decision is "capricious" ifit is made 
without a "rational basis." American Lung, 142 Idaho at 547, 130 P.3d at 1085. And, a decision 
is generally an abuse of discretion if the decision-maker (1) did not correctly perceive the issue 
as one of discretion; (2) did not act within the boundaries of such discretion and consistent with 
applicable legal standards; or (3) did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. See, e.g., 
Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 768, 86 P.3d 475,482 
(Idaho 2004). 
Under these circumstances, the Director's inclusion of Thompson Creek within WDl 70 
was arbitrary and capricious pursuant to Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3)(e). This error 
prejudiced Thompson Creek because it resulted in the creation ofWDl 70-an action which 
Thompson Creek opposes because of additional governmental restrictions and due to the extra 
costs that will be required to fund WDl ?O's operations. Because the W&SR Agreement 
provides the only arguable basis for creating WD 170, Thompson Creek must therefore be 
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excluded from the water district if this Court affirms the creation of the district by the Director. 
This result is dictated both by ordinary contract principles and the specific language of the 
judicial order approving the Agreement. 
E. There Is No Statutory Authority For The Creation Of "Sub-Districts" 
The WDl 70 Order converts three pre-existing water districts in Basin 72 into "sub-
districts" of WDl 70. (R., Vol. 3, p. 578.) The WDl 70 Order requires these "sub-districts" to 
continue to meet annually to elect their own watermasters, adopt their own budgets, select their 
own advisory committees, and distribute surface water rights within their boundaries. 
(R., Vol. 3, p. 578.) In short, these "sub-districts" are to continue operating as water districts, as 
they had in the past. 
However, the water district statutes in Title 42, Chapter 6 simply do not contain any 
provisions allowing for the creation of"sub-districts." Rather, the Director may only "create" a 
new water district, "revise the boundaries of' an existing water district, "abolish" an existing 
water district," or "combine two (2) or more water districts" into one water district. 
LC. § 42-604, ,r 2. Nowhere in this language is there any authorization for "sub-districts." 
Important in this regard is the fact that, as a state agency, the Department and its Director only 
have those authorities that have been specifically granted by the Idaho Legislature. See, e.g., 
Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513,514,915 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Idaho 1996); Simpson v. 
Louisiana Pac. Corp., 134 Idaho 209,212,998 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Idaho 2000). 
Presumably, the Director relies upon the authority in Section 42-604 to "combine" two or 
more water districts as the basis for "sub-districts." However, by its plain language, that 
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provision simply allows the Director to convert two or more pre-existing water districts into one 
water district. It does not provide any authority for the two-tiered "sub-district" structure created 
by the Director, in which there are multiple mini-water districts within a larger "umbrella" water 
district. 
And, there are a number of problems with this two-tiered structure that illustrate 
Thompson Creek's prejudice. First, these "sub-districts" are still subject to the authority of 
WDl 70 and its watermaster, as the WDl 70 Order does not abrogate the authority ofWDl 70 
over water users within those three pre-existing water districts. This essentially creates a two-
tiered authority structure in which the water users within the "sub-districts" are required to 
continue to spend the time and money required to operate entities that are ultimately subject to 
the authority ofWDl 70. 
And, because of this structure, affected water users within these "sub-districts" are 
subject to assessments from both the "sub-districts" and from WD 170. Conclusion of Law 31 (f) 
in the WDl 70 Order specifically states that, "sub-districts may collect assessments to pay the 
pro-rata expenses of the Upper Salmon Water District. ... " (R., Vol. 3, p. 578.) Similarly, 
Conclusion of Law 9 of the WD 170 Order specifies that, "each sub-district may be subject to 
future assessments for costs associated with oversight of that sub-district," and goes on to 
enumerate a number of different items that qualify as "oversight costs." (R., Vol. 3, pp. 572-73.) 
Simply put, the water district statutes in Title 42, Chapter 6 of the Idaho Code contain no 
authority for this two-tiered, "sub-district" structure. And, they certainly do not contain authority 
for assessments by any entity other than a water district. While Section 42-604 provides for 
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combining multiple water districts into one water district, this is different than the two-tiered 
authority structure involved with the Director's "sub-district" arrangement. 
By creating these "sub-districts" without authority to do so, the Director's actions were 
"in violation of ... statutory provisions" and were "in excess of the statutory authority of the 
[Department]" and were, accordingly, in violation of the Idaho APA. See l.C. § 67-5279(3)(a), 
(b) ( emphasis added). 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The Record before this Court demonstrates numerous procedural and substantive 
violations of Idaho law by the Director. Despite the clear authority, the Director plunged 
forward to create WD 170 because the W &SR Agreement "required" him to do so. Due Process, 
statutory criteria, evidence in the record, concerns of actual people with actual private property 
rights, did not cause him to waiver or objectively consider these matters. Instead, he knew what 
the W &SR Agreement "required" him to do and he did it. 
His decision to create WDl 70 violates Thompson Creek's constitutional Due Process 
rights, is not based upon substantial evidence in the record, and does not comply with Idaho's 
water district statutes. As such, the Director's decision to create WDl 70 violates multiple 
provisions of the Idaho AP A. Therefore, this Court should reverse the Director's decision to 
create WD 170. However, if this Court affirms the creation of WD 170, then it should order that 
Thompson Creek be specifically excluded from this district. 
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acknowledges that Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 ("Rule 408·) suppli~ J appropriate 
framework for determining whether evidence of a settlement agreement Is admiss1h1e in a court 
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u 
proceeding. However, provision four of the Stipulatlon appc11rs to overreach' the cope of Rule 
I 
408 by uslna !he rule as a preemptive tool against challenges In future court !proceedings .. 
I 
Therefore, the State respectfully suggests tliat provision four of the Sdpulat16n iJ rejected and 
' : ! 
that the court simply order that subsc:quern use of the Stipulation will be governed ~Y Rule 408. 
I 
The proposed Stipulation provides, In part, that nothing in the Stiplilation or Its 
I 
M&Otlations may be construed as admissions against Interest or used as evldencd to show !he • 
l 
validity or invalidity of the stipulating parties' claims, by any party ln the SRBA and related 
procccdlnas. Stipulation And Joint Motion For Order Approvlna Stipulatloil J Dismissing 
Objections, at 4 . .Accordingly, the United States and Thompson Creek Minfug chmpany have 
' 
requested an order from this coun to prevent any party from Introducing ithc !tipulatlon as 
evidence in a later court proceedlne. Id. at 5. Rule 408, however, docs not ~t the court · 
to prejudge whether any proposed use of the stipulation is precluded at this time. )Rather, such 
a decision must be made at the time the stipulation is offered into evidence.· Wblte the United 
' 
Slates and Thompson Creek Mining Company acknowledge that the Stipulation could be 
' 
challenged "for a pllfPOSe contemplated by Rule 408," id. at 5, the broad lai!guage of the 
i 
Stipulation and scope of tho rc:quested order appear to confllct with this sraterncnt.1 
. I I 
II. TllE IDAHO RULES OF EVIDENCE AND IDAHO C~ LAW 
CONTEMPLATE A CASE-BY-CASE DETERMINATION OF iWHETHER 
SETILEMENT EVIDENCB IS ADMISSWLE. . i . 
Rule 408 olltlines circumstances under whlcll evidence of a scttlcdicnt b settlement · 
negotiations may or may not be admissible. It states: : j 
Evidence of (1) l\lmishlng, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2)! ace pting, 
offering, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed either as to vali4ity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount ;of the 
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or st.atements made in 
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compromial: negotiations is llkewise not admissible. Tl1iS mle does not , quire 
the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because i it is 
presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule docs not re/quire 
exclusion if the evidence is offered for another plllpo&e, sucb as provinf: bias or 
prejudice of a witness, negativing a conrontion of Wldue delay. or provibg an 
, P. 004 
effort lo obstruct a criminal investigation or prosccution, CoJmr · llllS. • e ___ • 
negotiations encompass mediation; i · . 
ldabo R. Bvld. 408. By its own u,nns, Rule 408 does not exclude evld . relating :to 
settlements when the evidence is offered to show bias or prejudice. Id,; sec 'also.I Davidson v. 
Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 109, 153 P.2d 1253, 1255 (1987); Soria v, Sierra PJ(tlc Airlines, 
, I . 
Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 605, 726 P.2d 706, 717 (1986). Similarly, the Idaho Silprc$e Court has 
determined that the rule does not eirelude evidence of inconsistent Statemen~ fro~ seulemcnt 
negotiations, noting that the rule's list of admissible evidence relating to setttbment is not · 
exhaustive. Davidson, 114 Idaho at 109, 7S3 P.2d at 1255. j 
Consequently, the cirCIIIDlltances under which settlement evidence• ma ·. be deemed 
admissible or inadmissible do not arise 11ntll the settlement evidence has ktilally been 
i . 
proffered. At that time, it is appropriate for a trial court lo consider whethet, un~er Rule 408, 
the proffered evidence Is admissible. A trial court has broad discretion to dctcnbne wh0thcr 
settlement evidence ls admissible in light of the facts and Issues presented bl. the lease. Soria, . 
; i 
Ill Idaho at 606, 726 P.2d at 718; Dory v. Blshara, 123 Idaho 329, 335, 848 P.2d 387, 393 
(1992). 
Moreover, when determining whether settlement evidence is admis~ble,. a trial court 
i 
must balance the probative value of 1h11 proffered evidence against any unfait !prejudice, in 
accordance with Idaho Rule ofEVidence 403. Davidson, 114 Idaho at 110,753 ~.2d at 12S6; 
' ' j . 
Soria, 111 Idaho at 606, 726 P.2d at 718, The probative value of the protTeted evi!lence (e.;., 
! 
the evidence of settlement) ts measurccl by the degree of relevance and 'matelriality of the 
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V 
evidence and the necessity of the evidence for the Issue on which it is lntroduc David3dn, · 
114 Idaho at 110, 753 P,2d at 1256. The coun welahs this value against any uJ1r prejudice, 
conslderina whether the evidence will be giVen undue weight or will result ~ an kequity. Id. 
' 
"Only after usina this balancing test, may a trial judge use bis discretion to pro rly admit 'or ' 
exclude the proffered evidence." Id. · 
An order precluding future use of the proposed Stipulation to cballtinge ontradictdry 
statements and other similar circumstances would, in effect, eliminate the broad iscrctlon and 
balancing duties of the court presented with the evidence. 
m. CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the state of Idaho respectfully requests this court . to limit ally 
l 
approval of the Stipulation And Joint Motion For Order Approving Stipulatlcin A.Jld Dismissing 
I . 
I . 
Objections with the proviso that later attempt! to use th.e. Stipulation as· evidence will be 
governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 408. The State further requests this coJ to deny the 
I 
Stipulation's fourth provision, and the corresponding request for an order ebforcing that 
provision, which states that nothing in the Stipulation or its negotiations may bJ consuued as 
admissions against interest or used as evidence to show the validity or invalidity f the United 
StateS' claims, by any party in the SRBA and related proceedings, 
DATED this 12" day of Jlllle 1998. 
ALAN G. LANCE 
Attorney General 
Deputy Attorney General 
Nalllrlll Resources Division 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this /4-1(., day of June 1998, I caused to be sc~ed a copy of ~e · 
foreaoing STATE OF IDAHO'S RESi'ONSE MEMORANDUM TO ~ umTED · 
STATES/THOMPSON CREEK MOTION TO APPROVlll STIPULATION b' U.S. Mall, 
postage prepaid to the addressees on the following court lists: 
' 
Court Certificate of Mailing for MUSYA Claims (Consolidated Subcasc 
63-25239) dated June 2, 1998. 
Court Certificate of Mailing for Wild & Scenic Claims (Consolidated ~b se 
75-13316) dated June 2, 1998. 
Court Certificate of Mailing for Wilderness NRA (Consolidated SUbcrise 7 • 
13605) dated June 2, 1998. 
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Deputy Attorney General 
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Court Certificate of MalUng for Wild and Scenic RiWI' Claims 
Consolldated Subcase: 75-13316 
Director ofIDWR 
POBox83720 
Boise, ID 83 720-0098 
Chief, Natural Resources 
Division 
Office of Attorney Gene?al 
State of Idaho 
P0Box44449 
Boise, ID 8371 1-4449 
U.S. Dept of Justice 
Environment & Natural 
Resource$ Division 
SSO W Fort St, MSC 033 
Boise, ID 83 724 
Josephine P. Beeman 
Beeman & Hofstetter 
PO Box 1427 
Boise, ID 83701-1427 
Scott L. Campbell 
Elam&Burke 
PO Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83 70 I 
Gary A. Demott 
c/o 9185 Colleen 
Boise, ID 83 709 
Jeffery C. Fereday 
Givens Pursley, LLP 
P0Box2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
Ronald T. Schindler 
Thomas E. Root 
Root & Schiru:ller 
4 IO 17th Street, Suite 840 
Denver, CO 80202 
William K. Fletcher 
Fletcher Law Office 
POBox248 
Blll'lcy, ID 83318-0248 
Roger D, Ling 
Ling Nielsen & Robinson 
POBox396 
Rupert, ID 83350 
J. Frederick Mack 
Munay D, Feldman 
Holland & Hurt 
POBox2527 
Boise, ID 83 70 l 
Don A. Olowinsld 
Hawley, Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley 
PO Box 1617 
T:loise, ID 83701 
RWRettig 
Rettla & Rosenbeny 
POBox729 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
RayW,Riaby 
R.igby Thatcher Andrus 
Rigby Kam & Moeller 
P0Box2S0 
Rexburg, ID 83440 
John A. Rosholt 
James C. Tucker 
Rosholt Robertson & Tucker 
PO Box 1906 
Twin Falls. ID 83 303-1906 
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John T. Sob oeder 
Schroeder Lozuniz 
POBox267 
Boise, ID d101 
Tenyt.~·na 
JR Simplot ompany 
P0Box27 
Boise, ID Sl 707 
MicWIMi~dc 
Bogle & OlltCS PLLC 
Two Union lsquare 
601 Union Street , 
Seattle WA198101-2346 
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Court Certificate of Ma!Jtng for Wfldernm Claims 
Consolidated Subcase: 75-131105 
Dlreotor ofIDWR Joffiey C. Femiay 
POBox83720 Givens Pursley, LLP 
Boise, ID 83 720-0098 PO Boic2720 
Boise, TD 83701 
Chief, Natural Resources 
Division William K. Fletcher 
Office of Attorney General POBox248 
State ofldabo Burley, ID 83318-0248 
POBox44449 
Boise. ID 83711-4449 Roger O. Ling 
Lins Nielsen & Robinson 
U.S. Dept of Justice POBox396 
Environment & Nalllral Rupert, ID 83350 
Resources Division 
550 W Fort St, MSC 033 Don A. Olowinski 
Boise, ID 83 724 Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley 
Clayton M. Badley PO Box 1617 
1220 East l 0th North Boise, IO 83701 
Mountain Rome, ID 83647 
HWRcttig 
Jerry W. Badley PO Box 729 
POBox601 CQJdwell, ID 83605 
Willows, CA 95988 
RayW.Rigby 
Josephine P. Beeman Rigby Thatcher Andrus Rigby 
Bceman & Hofstetter I<am & Moeller 
PO Box 1427 POBox2SO 
Boise, ID 83701-1421 Rexburg, ID 83440 
Scott L. Campbell John A. Rosholt 
El11111 & Burke Rosholt Robertson & Tucker 
PO Box 1539 PO Box 1906 
Boise, ID 83701 Twin Palls, ID 83303 
Gary Demott Ronald E. Schindler 
C/O 9185 Colleen Thomas E. Root 
Boise, ID 83 709 Root & Schindler 
41 O 17th Street Ste. 840 
Denver, CO 80202 
TEL:208 334 2690 P. 00 . ..:..8 __ 
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June2,lBBB 
John T. S edcr 
Schroeder &! Lezamiz 
POBox267! 
Boise, ID 83L~o l 
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Boise, ID 83F 07 
Michael Minlnde 
Bogle &. Oat~ PLLC 
Two Union Square 
601 Union S cct 
Seattle WA 8101-2346 
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Director ofIDWR Sally Dahl 
POBox83720 POBox296 
Boise, ID 83720-0098 Challis, ID 83226 
Chief, Nat'I Resources Div Gary A. Demott 
Office: of Attorney General c/o 9185 Colleen 
State of Idaho Boise, ID 83 709 
POBol<44449 
Boise, ID 83711-4449 . Willis & Belly Deveny 
PO Box 1160 
U.S. Dept of Justice Riggins, ID 83549 
Environment & Natural 
· Rcsolll'Ces Dlvlvision Jeffrey C. Fereday 
550 W Fort St. MSC 033 Givens Pursley, LLP 
Boise, ID 83724 POBox2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
Clayton M. Badley 
1220 East loth North William K. Fletcher 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 Fletcher Law Office 
POBox248 
Jerry W. Badley Burley, ID 83318-0248 
POBox601 
Willows, CA 95988 Gary & Elaine Funck 
POBox858 
Josephine P. l3eeman Challis, ID 83226 
Beeman & Hofstetter 
PO Box 1427 Harold Horton 
Boise, ID 83701-1427 PO Box 1089 
Challis, ID 83226 
Scott L. Campbell 
Elam & Buike Jose Ditch Company 
PO Box 1539 Thomas V. McGowan 
Boise, ID 83701 PO ao x 1040 
Challis, ID 83226 
Challls Inigation CO. 
POBox71 Gary Kimble 
Challis, ID 83226 PO13ox 568 
Challis, ID 83226 
Howard Cutlc:r 
HC 67 Box 2066 Doyle & Jud! Leuzinger 
Challis, ID 83226 HC 67 l3ox 208S 
Challis, ID 83226 
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Hawley Tror' I Ennis & 
Hawley , 
PO Box 161 : 
Boise, ID 831701 
HWRettig 
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Bruce M. Smith 
Rosholt Robemon & Tucker 
PO Box2139 
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Terry T, Uhling 
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P0Box27 
Boise, ID 83 707 
Madee E. YacomeU11 
PO Box SI 
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Bogle & Oates PLLC 
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